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24 US foreign policy in Lebanon 
.Anne 1vfarie Baylouny1 
For Americans, Lebanon conjures up images of terrorism and Israeli invasions. More recently, 
Lebanon's mass demonstrations to rid the country of its Syrian occupation swept the media in 
2005. Often called the Cedar revolution, the West saw contrasting images of Western-looking 
women and black-dad Islamists. The perspective of Lebanese politics neatly divided into 
two--one western, Lebanese, and democratic, the other lslamist, non-Lebanese, and anti-
democratic-has permeated US perspectives of the country. Moreover, this divided view of 
Lebanese domestic politics is usually equated with international and regional alignments and 
conflicts. Domestic actors here are viewed as reflecting regional ambitions and not their own 
political priorities. Throughout Lebanon's history, actors have been seen to represent the 
opposing forces in the cold war, civilizational divisions, or neighboring hostile states. These 
lenses, obscuring the domestic players' interests, transmit a skewed interpretation of Lebanese 
politics and hinder a complete understanding of the effects of US foreign policy in Lebanon. 
In this chapter, I describe US policy during its various phases. I begin with the common 
petroleum and business interests of the post-war era. I then analyze US intervention in Leba-
non during its first civil war of 1958, interpreted as a fight between pro-Soviet and pro-
American groups. In the 1980s, President Reagan entered Lebanon's civil war in force, 
resulting in the bombing of American facilities as the US took sides. From that time, US 
personnel in Lebanon have been scarce and American policy informed even more by its 
Lebanese allies than previously. Support for business elites continued as Syrian forces occupied 
Lebanon after the civil war. In 2003, US policy in Lebanon focused on combating Syria and 
Iran. The US demanded the disarmament of Lebanese Islamist group Hezbollah's militia. US 
support for the 2006 Israeli-Lebanese war and the Israeli bombing of Lebanon was driven by 
this desire to eliminate Hezbollah militarily. The intense split that resulted after the war 
between the opposition groups (including Hezbollah) and the government saw the US on the 
side of the government during the most current phase of US policy. Throughout the descrip-
tion of these phases of US actions in Lebanon, I address the other themes that constitute the 
foundation of US policy. I analyze the influence of Israeli priorities and the US response to 
Israeli actions, US support for Lebanon's military and the actions of the military, and the 
persistent view of Lebanese domestic actors solely as pawns of regional actors. 
Despite the differing stages of US policy, I argue that the basic orientation of the US 
toward Lebanon has remained constant. US policy in Lebanon is founded on support for 
Lebanon's ruling elite who ally with US interests. The common priorities of both this ruling 
elite and the US include an open economy and business with the US. The resulting US for-
eign policy stance embracing the status quo necessarily commits the US to propping up a 
traditional elite and the confessional system that returns it to office. To rationalize its support 
for a Lebanese political system that institutionalizes traditional and religious distinctions, US 
officials depict confessionalism in Lebanon as peacefol multiculturalism. 2 In this story, pro-
blems in Lebanon are attributed to external actors; the Lebanese people themselves constitute 
a harmonious system of religious co-existence. Following this interpretation, the opposition 
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must necessarily be portrayed as controlled by other countries or antagonistic to Lebanon's 
working democracy. Thus, as the Lebanese opposition expresses reservations toward US policy 
preferences, Washington stands against groups calling for a secular, non-religious system. 
US actions in Lebanon have proceeded through several phases. Prior to the 1950s, the US 
was involved in Lebanon through support for Western, mainly Christian, business elites and 
US oil pipeline priorities. Cold war battles overlay these business and oil concerns from the 
1950s to 1980. In the 1980s, during the Lebanese civil war, Israeli interests became dominant. 
After the civil war, backing for Western business elites continued while the US played a 
background role, acquiescing to the Syrian occupation of Lebanon. Regional animosities took 
pride of place when Syria opposed the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the US shed its low-
key policy for activism once again. Since that time, US policy has focused on countering 
Syrian and Iranian influence, particularly as that influence is believed to be represented by the 
lslamist group Hezbollah. As a result, the US supported Israeli military action against Hez-
bollah, most notably in the 2006 war, and continued to actively back the ruling government 
against its domestic opposition. 
Running through these various phases were some constants: the concern for Israel, the 
influence of strong links to Westernized Lebanese business elites, and interpretations of Leba-
nese politics as controlled by regional actors. As a solution to these issues, the US maintained a 
long-standing policy of building a strong Lebanese military and aligning with military actions 
in Lebanon against groups affiliated with regional enemies of the US. Old friends were sup-
ported while Lebanese soil was used to send messages to hostile countries. 
These US policies have not generated positive results for the US. US policy has not main-
tained Lebanon as a friendly to the US or combated regional enemies in Lebanon. US sup-
port for Israeli attacks in Lebanon turned increasing numbers of Lebanese against the US. 
The policy of siding with unpopular ruling elites prevented compromise between those elites 
and opposition groups, resulting in potentially violent domestic tensions and political standoffs. 
Further, US aid to Lebanon's military as a method of achieving US policy goals is flawed. 
Bolstering the military is founded on the assumption that a strong Lebanese military would 
control the country, enforce the rule of the pro-Western elites in government, and act as a 
bulwark against domestic militias and external countries alike. The Lebanese military has not 
fulfilled this government-supporting role, but instead avoided conflicts with all but unarmed 
domestic demonstrators and some unpopular foreign groups. The Lebanese armed forces act 
in accord with Lebanese public opinion and have tacit agreements with the actors that the US 
wants them to disarm, such as Hezbollah. In the most favorable of interpretations, ignorance 
is responsible for misdirected US policies. The US has inadvertently taken stances in domestic 
Lebanese conflicts while believing itself neutral. Viewed on the ground as partisan, the US and 
its officials have been attacked as participants in on-going conflicts. 
By itself, Lebanon is a minor player in US foreign policy concerns. 3 Lebanon's importance 
to the US today comes not through waterways or oil assets, but through the country's relation 
to other conflicts and actors of importance.+ Lebanon's geographical position on the front lines 
of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and its domestic opposition movements, allied to the Soviet Union 
or Iran, have continually returned the country to the attention of US policymakers. Building 
on the lslamist groups and enemies of Israel operating in Lebanon, larger regional and inter-
national conflicts dominated the interpretation of Lebanese politics for the media and inter-
national community. US policies furthered this minimization of domestic Lebanese factors in 
politics. As Lebanon alone was of little interest to the US public, US officials portrayed 
Lebanon's fate as linked to important issues of oil and relations with the Gulf in order to 
generate foreign policy interest. 5 Local grabs for power appeared to be religious battles of 
Muslims against Christians, or Western civilization under threat from world communism. The 
Lebanese themselves are complicit in this perception, emphasizing international actors over 
Lebanon's domestic groups. For their own purposes, some Lebanese have translated their 
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politics into terms easily digested in US policy circles: Christian versus Muslim, Communist 
versus Western. The US appeared to comprehend the difference between rhetoric and reality 
when its officials were on the ground in 1958. Since then, information about Lebanon has 
increasingly arrived with US intelligence already packaged and interpreted by others with 
their own interests, interests that often conflict with those of the US. 
The Lebanese domestic political structure 
A brief outline of the Lebanese domestic political structure is necessary to interpret US foreign 
policy, as US actions continually intersect with the differing factions in Lebanon. France cre-
ated Lebanon from the Ottoman territories of Greater Syria, expanded from a small moun-
tain area to include the surrounding grain-producing areas. The League of Nations, 
predecessor to the United Nations, granted France a mandate to rule the country, ostensibly 
to guide the country to independence and democracy. The jerry-mandered drawing of Leba-
non's borders generated a slight majority of Christians along with Sunni, Shi'a, and Druze 
populations. This slight numerical superiority of the Christian population was established in 
the country's only census of 1932. The country's democracy was based on confession or reli-
gious identity, and all political institutions were based upon these identities. Upon indepen-
dence in 1943, the informal National Pact provided that the president would be from the 
dominant Christian sect, Maronite Catholic, the prime minister would be a Sunni, and the 
parliament led by a Shi'a. A complicated formula similarly allocated government positions and 
representation by sect. 
The other element of the understanding reached between the Christian and Muslim elites at 
independence was that Lebanon would not lean either Eastward or Westward: it would not 
bind itself to the West as the Christians wanted, nor to the Arab world as the Muslims 
wanted. The communities agreed to disagree. The precarious nature of the new state meant 
that it would continue to be dependent upon France and subject to repeated battles for lea-
dership and changes in government policy. Government mainly fonctioned as a sinecure for 
traditional notables from the different communities, while funding a patron-client system. 
Electoral rules return communal politicians to office, and many political posts are inherited. 
The formula dividing positions by religious sect forestalled real change in government policy, 
solidifying a minimalist state in a country with large rural and underdeveloped areas. The 
problem of underdeveloped rural areas has persistently nagged at all subsequent Lebanese 
governments. 
Two main trends arose from the divisions embodied in the National Pact. Out of the 
Christian, pro-Western side, the trend of "Lebanists" emerged, those wishing to side openly 
with the West and eschewing their Arab heritage and connections. They insisted on Christian 
domination of Lebanese politics. The early institutional manifestation of this political trend 
was the right-wing Phalange or Kata'ib political party, later a militia, inspired by the fascist 
parties of Europe in the 1930s. This trend became identified as separatist, desiring to split a 
portion of Lebanon off from the Muslim rest of the country. The second, looser grouping has 
been more typical of the Muslims and often pro-Arab, siding with the Palestinians and Arab 
nationalists at different times. Despite the apparent religious nature of the divisions, these 
political trends were not split along religious lines but cut across them. The Phalange with its 
overtly Christian philosophy was overwhelmingly Christian, but Christians were present in 
large numbers in other anti-Phalange political and military groups. Lebanon's conflicts were 
not about religious dogmas or hostility toward other religions per se, but were battles for 
control of the country that largely fell along the differing perspectives of the religious groups. 
The sides are more aptly described as rightist versus leftist. As the conflicts progressed, polar-
ization along religious identity did occur, and massacres and ethnic cleansing were directed at 
religious and ethnic groups in themselves. 
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Oil transit, business elites, and initial US interests 
US interests in Lebanon in the 1940s and early 1950s were dominated by the importance of 
petroleum interests and commerce. Washington sought to acquire the oil needed to meet post-
war requirements, establish US businesses as prominent or dominant in Middle East trade, 
and secure the US politically over European countries. These goals were undertaken through 
direct diplomacy and covert actions. The consequences of US policy priorities in Lebanon at 
this time set an enduring American pattern of endorsing the confessional religious system 
against detractors. 
In the post-war era, Lebanon, or more precisely its capital Beirut, became a trading center 
between East and West. Lebanon of this time has been referred to as the "Switzerland" (or 
Paris) of the Middle East. Democratic freedom, respected institutions of higher education, free 
markets, and a Western elite existed in a regional sea of coups, counter-coups, revolutions, and 
bolstering war rhetoric. US oil companies, airlines, and businesses found Lebanon an impor-
tant site for profit in the region. To oil companies and US oil interests, Lebanon was central to 
the oil pipeline that ended in the Lebanese city of Sidon.6 The pipeline, TAPLlNE (Trans 
Arabian Pipeline Company), owned by several Western oil companies, pushed Beirut to be a 
commercial center joining Eastern Arab countries with Western business representatives. 
Lebanon was a gateway not only for oil and gold to reach the West, but also for \¥estern 
goods to head East. ARAMCO and Pan American Airways were heavily involved in Lebanon. 
American airlines set up shop in Lebanon seeking supremacy over air routes to the Gulf 
states. 7 
Underneath the pleasant appearance of this commercial hub was the confessional system-
political rule built upon religious identity-that constituted the foundation for continued 
business and policy aligned with US interests. American officials were intertwined with both 
business interests from their own country and the Lebanese commercial elite who ran the 
country. The confessional system kept those elites in power that had like interests with the US, 
namely that Lebanon remain an economy unconditionally open to Western business and 
American governmental priorities. This Lebanese elite placed their commercial interests above 
political and foreign policy differences with the US. Despite their personal disagreement with 
US policy in Palestine, the Lebanese elite subordinated such disagreement to continued trade. 
Further, representatives of the Lebanese business elite had direct, personal connections to 
officials in Washington,8 and it was their interpretation of Lebanese domestic politics that 
Washington heard. American officials and Lebanese business alike portrayed Lebanon as a 
democratic, pro-Western country, unique in its mix of peaceful religious groups. This view 
supported the maintenance of the confessional system.9 The image of a stable, happy Leba-
non, with no interference from external powers, persisted against reports to the contrary from 
US officials on the ground. America was heavily involved in propping up this system, even 
funding local elections to result in its allies' favor. 
The cold war and Lebanon's first civil war 
The cold war era in Lebanon demonstrates the complex overlay of international hostilities 
onto domestic battles. The US became militarily embroiled in Lebanon's domestic affairs in 
1958 when Lebanon's President Chamoun invoked the Eisenhower Doctrine. He claimed to 
be threatened by international communism by way of Arab nationalism and Egypt's charis-
matic president Gamal Abdel-Nasser. At times, a struggle between the Soviet and American 
spheres of influence played out in coups, revolutions, and the spread of Arab nationalism 
throughout the Middle East. In reality, these event5 were more about Arab nationalism and 
discarding regimes left by the colonial powers (France and Britain) than intrinsically pro-Soviet 
or anti-American. But the US administration considered Arab nationalism, spearheaded by 
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Abdel Nasser, to be under the sphere of influence and control of Moscow. Socialism-not 
communism-was indeed a central component of many opposition movements of this time, 
albeit a modified version often called Arab socialism. Many Arab nationalist movements and 
states did become allied with the Soviets. The terms of Soviet~Arab relations were often rocky, 
and the Soviet Union was not often the alliance of choice for Arab nationalists. Still, in the 
polarized environment of the 1950s, overthrowing a pro-Western regime denied the possibility 
of allying with the West. 
The civil war in which the US intervened in 1958 began with the Lebanese president's 
attempt to unconstitutionally extend his tenure in office. 10 While Washington supported the 
president and wanted to protect its oil and commercial interests, it did not want to intervene 
militarily until regional events changed. 1 1 President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles 
were convinced Lebanon was threatened by communism, but did not want to confront Nasser. 
In part, this was because they believed that Nasser and Arab nationalism had significant 
popular support. Bound by the Eisenhower Doctrine, the US said it would abide by the 
findings of a United Nations observer group that determined whether Lebanon was truly 
threatened by international communism. The observer group did not find evidence of com-
munist interference, and Washington was therefore not obliged to intervene. 12 On the ground, 
US officials continued to argue that the conflict was one of personalities and unequal repre-
sentation, not communism. The president was widely unpopular, he ruled with broad pre-
rogative, and he marginalized other elites who in turn mobilized against his rule. 
Once the US sphere of influence had been severely reduced as a result of the Iraqi Revo-
lution in July, Washington decided to enter the Lebanese presidential crisis. On top of the 
Iraqi Revolution that toppled a pro-Western monarchy, internal socialist opposition was 
threatening the Jordanian regime, a Western ally, and Egypt and Syria entered the Soviet 
orbit by forming the United Arab Republic in 1958. Not wanting to lose another ally and 
desiring to send a message to Nasser and the Soviet Union, 13 the US sent the marines and 
army. The marines landed on the beach alongside sunbathing Lebanese. 
The actual intervention itself, entailing 15,000 troops and marines, was confused and lacked 
a commander or a defined mission. 14 The conflict essentially ended the second day of the US 
intervention with the impromptu meeting of the leaders of the American forces, the US 
ambassador, and General Shehab, head of the Lebanese army, at a roadblock on the road to 
the airport. The Lebanese army subsequently accompanied the marines to Beirut and acted as 
a buffer between them and the domestic population. The US forces avoided opposition-con-
trolled areas to prevent dashes, and essentially stayed off the radar. 15 Eisenhower sent Robert 
Murphy to negotiate a solution, which resulted in the election of the head of the Lebanese 
army, Shehab, to become president. 16 
On the ground, US officials corrected Washington's pervasive conclusion of Soviet med-
dling and were able to find a compromise without military involvement. The two militaries on 
the scene, the Lebanese and the American, never took part in fighting in this civil war. The 
US handling of this crisis reflected a nuanced view and acknowledgment of the domestic 
conflicts involved, which was not the case later in Lebanon's history. This permitted the US to 
stand aside, oversee new elections ousting the president who had called for US support in the 
first place, and help restore stability. The ability of the US to abandon its erstwhile ally Pre-
sident Chamoun in deference to the large existing opposition to his tenure facilitated the end 
of the crisis. 
The PLO and Shi'a in Lebanon 
Between the 1958 crisis and the civil war in 1975, Lebanon experienced large-scale demo-
graphic changes that drew continued American concern. From the late 1960s, the Palestinians, 
mobilized in the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and later the Lebanese Shi'a in the 
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Islamist political party and militia Hezbollah, drew the diplomatic ire of the US and military 
fire from Israel. Israeli invasions aimed to rid Lebanon first of the PLO then of Hezbollah. 
Both were declared terrorist organizations by the US, and Israeli actions against them had full 
American support. However, the two organizations are not equal in Lebanese politics. There 
are important differences between them that complicate current military moves against Hez-
bollah. While the PLO is a foreign organization, Hezbollah is not. 
The PLO has long been a problem for US policy. In 196 7, the Israeli takeover of the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip pushed more Palestinians into the surrounding countries, first to Jordan 
and then after 1970 to Lebanon. There were now 300,000 Palestinians living in sixteen camps 
in Lebanon. Palestinian organizations became increasingly militant, striking at Israel from 
neighboring countries. Israel struck back, and Lebanon was caught in the middle. Southern 
Lebanon became known as "Fatahland" after the main component of the PLO, Arafat's 
group, Fatah. As the PLO launched operations against Israel from Lebanese territory, the 
Lebanese army was powerless to intervene. One of the perennial characteristics of Lebanon 
ha5 been the weakness of its army. In 1969, the Lebanese army and the PLO agreed to the 
Cairo Accord, which stipulated they would leave each other alone. The army would not enter 
the Palestinian camps but was acknowledged as the sovereign power in southern Lebanon, and 
the PLO could continue its attacks on Israel. 17 Israel's retaliations against the PLO, most 
famously bombing the Lebanese airport in 1969 and assassinating PLO officials in Beirut in 
1973, highlighted the inept nature of Lebanese security. Again and again, Lebanon has been 
unable to prevent foreign actors from acting on Lebanese soil. 
Hezbollah, a group designated as terrorist by the US, arose through demographic changes 
linked to Israeli actions in Lebanon. Israel-PLO bombardments, along with the lack of eco-
nomic development, caused a rural exodus of the southern population into Beirut. Most of 
these were Shi'a Muslims, who settled in the southern suburbs of Beirut. Israeli invasions in 
1978 and 1982 drove more Shi'a north into Beirut. Lacking even basic government services 
such as drinking water and sewage collection, the residents organized to provide for them-
selves. Numerous small organizations arose, each with a limited capacity. Displaced Shi'a in 
urban Beirut formed the base of Hezbollah or the Party of God. This Islarnist militia, political 
party, and social service umbrella org-,mization formed in the wake of the Israeli invasion of 
1982 by uniting many of the existing social service and civil society organizations. 
Reagan, Israel, and Lebanon's long civil war 
Lebanon's long civil war broke out in 197 5 after much hostility and clashes among rival 
groups. Washington's main concerns in Lebanon after the oil pipeline TAPLINE ceased 
operating in 1976 were combating the PLO and avoiding a confrontation with the Soviets. 
While the war in Lebanon threatened to bring the PLO into a central influential position, US 
officials wanted to exclude the PLO from any potential negotiations on the future of the 
occupied Palestinian territories--the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Instead, the preferred nego-
tiating partner was Jordan. When the civil war ended, the PLO was marginalized and then 
became a legitimate player eliminating one US policy concern, but the war had also created 
Hezbollah, which remained armed. 
American promotion of the Christians in the war was part of the administration's embrace 
of the status quo ruling elites and part of its help to Israel. Israel and the right-wing Phalange 
militia were allies for a time, and the Phalange was clearly against the PLO. Israel sent arms 
to the Phalange militia with US approval, and if necessary the US was willing to supplement 
this indirect aid with direct military actions. 18 In 1976, Syria intervened in the Lebanese civil 
war with the blessing of the US to defend the Phalange, mainly Christian, forces against the 
Lebanese National Movement and its allies the PLO. At this point, the PLO and Phalange 
were the main protagonists and the Phalange was not doing well. Against the wishes of its ally 
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the Soviet Union, Syria intervened to defeat another Soviet ally using Soviet weapons. 19 
Washington approved these moves, viewing Syrian actions as positive for US interests as they 
thwarted the PLO and protected the Christian Phalange. But the administration was aware 
that too much Syrian involvement would draw the Israelis into the conflict. An Israeli move 
against Syria could incite Soviet intervention and a broader war with larger economic con-
sequences directly tied to US interests, including use of the oil boycott weapon. 20 Israeli needs 
and concerns about the Soviet actions were at the forefront of American policymakers' minds. 
For the rest of the 1970s, Lebanon was marginalized in US policy as the Carter administration 
focused on attempting an overall settlement that could subsume the Lebanese problem. 21 
Israel invaded Lebanon in 1978 and established a zone of influence in the south. 
Washington protested and voted for UN Security Council Resolution 425 calling for Israeli 
withdrawal. The US threatened a halt in aid to Israel, and Israel moved back to the strip it 
called its security zone on the border. It established a new, proxy militia in this occupied 
southern area, the South Lebanese Army (SL!\.). Israel and the SIA remained in southern 
Lebanon until 2000. The US did nothing further to push Israel to withdraw fully from 
Lebanese territory. 22 The United Nations sent a new unit, the United Nations Interim Force 
in Lebanon (UNITIL), to monitor Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon and provide security. The 
organization remains in Lebanon. 
American policy toward Lebanon shifted with the Reagan administration. Reagan was 
more confrontational than his predecessor, and his chief concern was the Soviets. In the 
Middle East, Reagan believed Israel to be a strong ally. Syria, in the Soviet orbit, was to be 
excluded from peace efforts. Despite this global perspective of superpower competition, US 
involvement in Lebanon would become entangled in domestic affairs, taking the right-wing 
Christian side in the conflict. Reagan brought US forces back into Lebanon, although unlike 
1958 the US forces engaged. The result was disastrous. In the end, the US was considered just 
another militia active in the war and was attacked as such. 
In 1981, Reagan sent Philip Habib to negotiate a crisis between Syria and Israel over 
Syrian missiles placed in Lebanon. He mediated again between Israel and the PLO over a 
particularly intense series of civilian casualties resulting from Israeli attacks in Beirut. A cea-
sefire between the PLO and Israel was put in place in 1981. 23 
In 1982, Israel invaded deep into Lebanon, surrounding West Beirut. Israel believed that 
Washington approved, as a result of conversations with Alexander Haig prior to the military 
action. Haig indicated that Washington did not oppose an Israeli invasion provided there was 
appropriate justification. 24 The invasion sparked widespread condemnation in the interna-
tional community, Israel, and the US. After the invasion, Washington vetoed UN resolutions 
calling for Israeli withdrawal or even a ceasefire. 25 The US shared Israel's goals in the inva-
sion, those of eliminating the PLO as a force, marginalizing the PLO in peace talks, and 
protecting Israel's northern border. As Israel bombed West Beirut heavily, Washington sought 
PLO withdrawal from Lebanon, and US officials decided on an appropriate location for PLO 
forces to relocate. 26 US troops briefly entered to see the PLO evacuate, and the US guaran-
teed the safety of the remaining Palestinian civilians, now without a militia for protection. The 
US troops left and the PLO went to Tunisia. Reagan presented a comprehensive peace 
initiative for the Palestinian issue without involving the PLO. The Reagan administration also 
informed Congress that Israel could have violated restrictions on the use of cluster bombs in 
the Lebanon war, and the administration then temporarily halted further cluster bomb trans-
fers to Israel. 
In September 1982, a few days after the US troops left, Lebanese President Bashir 
Gemayel, a close ally of Israel, was assassinated. Israeli troops went into West Beirut, against 
the agreement negotiated by Habib, and oversaw the massacre of about 2,000 unarmed 
Palestinians in the refugee camps by the Christian Phalange militia. The massacre of Sabra 
and Shatila camps became known throughout the world. Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon 
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was found by an Israeli commission to be partly responsible for the massacre. These massacres 
caused the marines to return to Beirut as part of the Multi-National Forces including French, 
British, and Italians. As American actions became more clearly aligned with Israel and the 
Christian forces, and the US lost the pretense of neutrality. Syria, the Soviets, the Shi'a, the 
PLO, and the Druze were all viewed as the opposing forces to the Americans. 27 Put simply, 
the conflict was viewed as Soviet-Muslim against Christian-Western. Now perceived as 
propping up Christian dominance of Lebanon, opposition Lebanese groups fired upon US 
positions. US troops were instructed to return fire against the advice of commanders on the 
ground. 28 American ships also bombed Druze and Syrian positions in the mountains. 
Washington staked its hopes on a new treaty signed with the Lebanese president. Amin 
Gemayel succeeded his brother as president and signed a peace treaty with Israel on May 1 7, 
1983. Known as the May 1 7 Accord, it delivered Israeli security demands, particularly reg-arding 
its proxy army in the south, while excluding Syria and non-Christian parties from the negotiations 
entirely. The accord placed the Lebanese government within the Israeli orbit and the US backed 
it fully. The May 17 Accord was viewed as the one accomplishment of the US administration 
in the Lebanese war and a vehicle for peace. 29 In reality, the accord narrowed support for the 
Lebanese president and drew the lines between the sides more sharply. The opposition came 
to rely more heavily on Syrian support. With the Christians isolated and unable to govern 
without Israeli or American firepower, Syria became the main power broker in Lebanon.30 
The response to American partiality in the Lebanese civil war came in attacks against the 
US embassy in April and October 1983, the latter resulting in 241 US troops dead. The 
French barracks were attacked as well. Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for the bombing. 
This Islamist group's relation to the Shi'a Islamist group Hezbollah, formed around this time 
with the help of the Iranian revolutionary guards, is murky, and Hezbollah is generally 
accused of the actions against American and French troops. The US responded by retreating 
from Lebanese soil to the coast and using the battleship USS New Jersry to strike at the 
mountains above Beirut, Druze and Shi'a territory presumed pro-Syrian and anti-American. 31 
In February 1984, US forces left Lebanon. The remainder of the war was characterized by 
kidnappings and the departure of virtually all foreigners from Lebanon. Numerous US hos-
tages were kidnapped and three were killed. Flights to Lebanon by US planes were prohibited 
from 1985, and a ban on all travel to Lebanon by US citizens was enacted from 1987 to 
1997.32 US policy degraded into defensive aggression and became entangled with Iran in the 
Iran-Contra scandal, partly to obtain influence over Iranian-allied actors in Lebanon. 33 In 
1985, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)-linked activities resulted in the bombing of a Beirut 
neighborhood in order to assassinate Sheikh Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah. The bombing 
killed eighty people but not its target. A major kidnapping of an American occurred days later. 
American goals in Lebanon in the mid- l 980s were to ensure the border with Israel, support 
the extension of the Multi-National Forces for peace and security in the border region, and to 
continue supporting the Lebanese government and army, training and arming the latter. 34 It 
was and still is the American belief that the Lebanese army can combat and replace the mili-
tias and anti-American forces operating in Lebanon such as the PLO and Hezbollah. 
Reconstruction and the Syrian occupation 
The end of the Lebanese civil war began with the Ta'if Accords signed in Saudi Arabia in 
1989, as the sides accepted a (slightly) modified government formula. The agreement changed 
the ~)'Stem slightly, decreasing the balance of Christians to Muslims from six to five, to equal 
numbers of both in parliament. Syria was a strong player in this accord, and led the new 
peacekeeping body in Lebanon, the Arab Deterrent Force. The accord did not delineate a 
final date to Syria's military role in Lebanon. The head of the Lebanese army, General Michel 
Aoun, vehemently disagreed with this treaty and waged a "war of liberation" against Syrian 
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occupation. In 1990, when Syria agreed to take part in the first Gulf war against the Iraqi 
Saddam Hussein's invasion and occupation of Kuwait, the US turned silent on SyTia's actions 
in Lebanon. 35 Syria dispensed with Aoun's war and extended its forces throughout Lebanon 
with the exception of the border area occupied by Israel and the South Lebanon Army. Syria 
remained in Lebanon until 2005. American policy sought a comprehensive peace treaty among 
all parties to the Arab~Israeli conflict after the Gulf war, initiating the Madrid peace process 
in 1992. Policy toward Lebanon was subsumed within this process or the country was ignored. 
The policy of supporting Lebanon's business and ruling elite continued after the civil war, 
in the person of Lebanon's Prime .Minister Rafiq Hariri. A business tycoon, he was pro-Western 
and advocated neoliberal economic reforms and privatization of Lebanese public companies. 
To accomplish these goals and reconstruction of the country after the civil war, Western countries 
lent large amounts of money to Hariri. 
The US began to pressure Syria after the US war in Iraq, a war Syria protested. In 2003, 
Congress passed the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act imposing 
sanctions on Syria for its continued occupation of Lebanon, among other things. This pro-
hibited trade from Syria to the US, airplane traffic of Syrian planes, financial dealings with the 
Bank of Syria, and allowed freezing of the assets of certain Syrians. In fall 2004, Lebanon was 
preparing to extend the term of President Emile Lahoud unconstitutionally, a move benefiting 
Syria. France and the US responded by promoting UN Security Council Resolution 1559 
calling for Syrian withdrawal from Lebanese territory. 
After the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in 2005, an aggression often 
attributed to Syria, anti-Syrian demonstrations in Lebanon caused Syria to end its long occu-
pation of the country. For Washington, these demonstrations-called the Beirut Spring in Leba-
non and the Cedar revolution in the West-affirmed the power of civil society and the pro-
w estern character of Lebanon. This view of Lebanon as either Western or Eastern, but not 
both, could not explain Lebanese reaction to the Israeli invasion of 2006 when the country 
turned anti-American. The US supported a UN investigation into those responsible for the 
assassination, believing it would lead to Syria. Lebanon's opposition, chiefly Hezbollah, opposed 
the investigation and tribunal into the assassination because of fears that international rulings 
in a pro-American court could be turned against them. 
Countering Syria, Iran, and Hezbollah 
US policy toward Lebanon in the 2000s was a by-product of US hostility to Hezbollah and 
Syria and its tight alliance with Israel. American goals in Lebanon after the end of the civil 
war went from support for a Syrian solution to the civil war to overt animosity to Syria and its 
presence in Lebanon, even after Syrian troops left the country. The US views Syria and Iran 
as controlling the actions of Hezbollah, whose continual skirmishes with Israel and association 
with Iran are major concerns to Washington. Hezbollah is also accused of sponsoring terror-
ism, and arguments have been made that Hezbollah is more of a danger than Al-Qaeda. 36 US 
foreign policy again sought to promote the Lebanese army and now Lebanese civil society in 
order to thwart Hezbollah. 
Clinton's advisors did not push Israel to withdraw from its occupied security zone in Leba-
non, called for in UN Security Council resolutions. Such a selective application of UN reso-
lutions led to charges that US policy suffered a pro-Israeli bias. 37 President Clinton affirmed hi5 
belief that the continued occupation was for Israel's security and the US should yield to Israel 
given that security consideration. 38 The 1990s saw multiple Israeli attacks on Lebanon that the 
US also did not protest. Israel bombed Lebanon particularly in 1993 and 1996, hitting civilian 
targets and causing large refugee populations. The operations were geared toward causing 
Hezbollah to disarm by forcing the Lebanese government to act. The US, through Secretary 
of State Warren Christopher, negotiated ceasefires. After the 1996 bombing, Christopher 
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negotiated agreement to a set of rules for keeping the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah 
and confined to military targets. An international force monitored the agreement, which 
includes US forces. 
Skirmishes continued between Israel and Hezbollah forces, and by 2000, the Israeli pre-
sence in southern Lebanon had become unpopular with the Israeli public. Israel withdrew in 
2000, intending to leave its proxy militia, the SLA, in place. The SL!\ collapsed, and its lea-
ders fled to Israel while others were tried in Lebanese courts. Hezbollah took over security in 
these areas of southern Lebanon. The Lebanese army did not exert control over southern 
Lebanon, a key demand of the US and Israel, until after the 2006 war. The Israeli withdrawal 
was not complete, but continued in an area known as the Sheb'a farms. Israel contends this 
area was Syrian, captured as part of the Golan Heights in 1967, while Lebanon and Syria 
maintain the area is Lebanese. 
The US continued to support Israeli action against Hezbollah, notably in the 2006 Israel-
Hezbollah war, known in Lebanon as the July war. While Israel withdrew from southern 
Lebanon in 2000, incursions, bombings, and clashes between Israel and Hezbollah persisted. 
In July 2006, Hezbollah captured two Israeli soldiers across the Lebanese border in Israel, 
intending them for a prisoner exchange (which had occurred before). The Israeli response was 
full-scale bombing and invasion of Lebanon, as Israel considered the taking of soldiers to be an 
act of war. In this war, the US approved of Israeli actions for the purposes of disarming 
Hezbollah. Some observers maintain the 2006 war was pushed by the US. 39 The American 
stance was clear inside Lebanon when the Bush administration did not push for a ceasefire. 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced that she would not press for a halt to hosti-
lities, as in her view the Israel-Lebanon war demonstrated "the birth pangs of a new Middle 
East."+o The remark indicated at least implicit support for Israel's actions and insensitivity to 
the devastation in Lebanon. The effect on Lebanese public opinion was clear: in this histori-
cally pro-American population, opinion swung decidedly anti-America.+ 1 
Once more into the fray 
US policy in Lebanon is in a quandary. Current US policy is focused on building Lebanese 
civil society and its armed forces, and pressuring the government to disarm Hezbollah. 
Washington supports the reigning government, called the March 14 coalition, against broad 
opposition spanning major Christian groups along with the Shi'a Hezbollah. While the US 
very publicly supports democracy, it objects to Hezbollah, an organization with significant 
electoral success in Lebanon. Further, other opposition groups who advocate an end to the 
confessional system are also not welcome in Washington. The result is American attempts to 
bolster civil society and win "hearts and minds," through increased economic aid, promotion 
of civil society, and still more help for Lebanon's military. 
The US gave economic aid through the civil war and after. The US Agency for Interna-
tional Development (USAID) sponsored projects in Lebanon throughout the civil war and 
after, in business, schools, and civil society. The US helped the Lebanese reconstruction effort 
even during the war. Washington funded projects to rebuild bridges, remove rubble, and 
donate foodstuffS.+2 The US gave around $35 million annually between 2001 and 2005, 
increasing dramatically after the 2006 war with Israel.+'.> After the 2006 war, aid stepped up in 
order to compete with Hezbollah's aggressive rebuilding of the areas destroyed by Israel. H Aid 
topped $800 million in 2007, which included economic, foreign, and military assistance. +s For 
most previous years, the amount was significantly lower, between $35 and 40 million. In 2008, 
$60 million was requested. While Washington expanded its economic assistance in recent 
years, this assistance never dealt with the fundamental lack of social service institutions in 
Lebanon and the state's confessional bias. American money worked through the state, mean-
ing the money was still allocated on confessional and patron--client lines. 
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Developing civil society is another focus of current US policy. The US encourages a wide 
range of civil and political society organizations in Lebanon and the broader Middle East 
through the Middle East Partnership Initiative, from literacy campaigns to election monitor-
ing. 4fi Altering attitudes was the focus of public diplomacy campaigns in Lebanon. USAJD 
supported an advertising campaign for the slogan "I love life," presumably in contrast to 
Hezbollah's emphasis on martyrdom and death. On the ground, the slogan was changed in 
order to protest against the public relations effort itself and turned into negative slogans such 
as "I love capitalism" and "I love sectarianism," highlighting Washington's support for the 
current government and confessionalism historically. Society also responded with positive slo-
gans, such as "We love life," affirming a difference between US individualism and support for 
the Lebanese community in its entirety.+7 
The US has begun to take an even clearer position on domestic Lebanese issues. In late 2007, 
the Bush administration issued an executive order freezing the assets of anyone participating in 
anti-democratic actions in Lebanon. The order was directed at what the administration con-
sidered interference by the Syrians, but was so worded that any members of the political opposi-
tion could be targeted. 48 As the largest element of the opposition, Hezbollah, already has 
sanctions against it by the US, the order threatened the other elements of the opposition who 
are chiefly Christian. This brings the US squarely into the domestic political fight for power. As 
has been witnessed previously in Lebanon, US officials became targets. The wave of bombings 
in Lebanon encompassed the US injanuary 2008, when embassy officials were attacked."9 
A consistent and continuing US policy has been the attempt to strengthen, train, and arm 
the Lebanese armed forces. This policy springs from the belief that a strong military would 
conquer militias hostile to the US such as the PLO previously, and Hezbollah, and Al-Qaeda-
affiliated groups in Lebanon currently. Iranian influence allied with Syria is another target of 
US policy. The belief that the Lebanese army would follow the (pro-Western) government's 
direction and move against Hezbollah or the PLO has not been borne out. The army has 
either split or refused to enter conflicts that force it to take sides on issues that divide the popula-
tion. US arms to the Lebanese army during the civil war were channeled directly to the differing 
militias, especially the Christian one. The Lebanese military only acts in reflection of popular 
opinion, and current Lebanese opinion supports the presence of Hezbollah and its militia. 
In 2007, the Lebanese army acted effectively against a small group of lslamist terrorists 
called Fatah al-Islam operating out of a Palestinian refugee camp in northern Lebanon. While 
appearing to bolster US faith in the Lebanese military's ability to control the country, the 
incident in fact confirms the Lebanese army's deference to public opinion. There was societal 
consensus for the military's actions, and even Hezbollah publicly approved. Further, the target 
of military action was viewed as foreign, not Lebanese, and not even affiliated with the 
Palestinian cause or the residents of the refugee camps. 
The fallacy of the US view that the Lebanese military could and would move against Hez-
bollah was borne out in the Hezbollah-Sunni militia clashes in May 2008. The army stayed 
absent from the fight, refusing to support the government, as Sunni militias filled that role. 
Hezbollah easily trounced these militias, then pulled back and allowed the Lebanese army to 
take over. For its part, the army reversed the governmental decrees that sparked the conflict. 
The incident demonstrates both Hezbollah's role in the Lebanese system and the futility of US 
attempts to remove the Islamist group. 
Conclusion: prospects for change? 
Throughout the differing phases of US policy in Lebanon, the US has sided with the ruling 
elites and the confessional system. The efficacy of lJS policy goals has suffered. Washington's 
depiction of any opposition to these ruling elites as puppets of disliked foreign countries has 
inhibited the ability to see the domestic popularity of these opposition groups and the 
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unpopularity of Lebanese governments. Foreign actors have surely acted in Lebanon, but they 
are not the cause of Lebanon's governing quandaries. Domestic discontent with the ruling 
elites persisted and periodically caused violent clashes. The precarious foundation upon which 
Lebanon is built has been propped up by US support even as it is further taxed by Israeli 
military actions. While the US views Hezbollah as the main danger in Lebanon, a large~by 
some accounts majority--of Lebanese instead perceive their danger is Israel. US support for 
Israel and for the ruling government serves short-term US policy goals of maintaining pro-
American elites in power. However, a longer perspective would question the wisdom of this 
policy. The popularity of the opposition, including Hezbollah, has only increased throughout 
US opposition to the group and the 2006 war with Israel. In 1958, the US recognized the 
domestic nature of grievances and the broad support for the opposition as due to the influence 
of officials on the ground. The isolation of US government officials since the 1980s has exa-
cerbated the reliance upon others for information and advice on Lebanon. Without an inde-
pendent view of the Lebanese situation, the US will continue to back one side in a domestic 
conflict without realizing the unpopularity of its ally. Such policies will not keep Lebanese 
friendly to the US or maintain US priorities in Lebanon when the ruling elite changes. 
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